MERIT-BASED RECRUITMENT, POLITICAL INTERFERENCE AND BUREAUCRATIC EFFICIENCY IN NIGERIAN PUBLIC SECTOR (A STUDY OF ANAMBRA STATE)

Abstract

The recruitment processes in the Nigerian public sector have been politicised and this has remained a persistent governance concern, with documented consequences for administrative efficiency. This study examined the relationship between merit-based recruitment, political interference and bureaucratic efficiency in the Nigerian public sector, with emphasis on Anambra State Ministries, Departments, and Agencies (MDAs). Adopting a descriptive survey design, data were collected from 248 civil servants across selected MDAs using structured questionnaires. The study was anchored on Weber's Bureaucratic Theory and the New Public Management framework. Three research questions and two hypotheses guided the inquiry. Findings indicated that political interference significantly and negatively affects merit-based recruitment practices, and that merit-based recruitment in turn exerts a positive and significant influence on bureaucratic efficiency. Regression analysis further confirmed that merit-based recruitment partially mediates the relationship between political interference and bureaucratic efficiency. The study concludes that the prevalence of political patronage in appointment processes undermines the competence base of the Nigerian public/civil service, with ripple effects on service delivery outcomes. The study recommends strengthening the Anambra State Civil Service Commission's independence, institutionalising transparent recruitment protocols, and embedding competence-based assessments as mandatory criteria for public-sector appointments.